

Treasury Management Mid-Year Report 2017/18

Introduction

In April 2002 the Authority adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's *Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice* (the CIPFA Code) which requires the Authority to approve treasury management semi-annual and annual reports.

The Authority's treasury management strategy for 2017/18 was approved at a meeting of the Authority on 21 February 2017. The Authority has borrowed and invested substantial sums of money and is therefore exposed to financial risks including the loss of invested funds and the revenue effect of changing interest rates. The successful identification, monitoring and control of risk are therefore central to the Authority's treasury management strategy.

External Context

Economic backdrop: Commodity prices fluctuated over the period with oil falling below \$45 a barrel before inching back up to \$58 a barrel. UK Consumer Price Inflation (CPI) index rose with the data print for August showing CPI at 2.9%, its highest since June 2013 as the fall in the value of sterling following the June 2016 referendum result continued to feed through into higher import prices. The new inflation measure CPIH, which includes owner occupiers' housing costs, was at 2.7%.

The unemployment rate fell to 4.3%, it's lowest since May 1975, but the squeeze on consumers intensified as average earnings grew at 2.5%, below the rate of inflation. Economic activity expanded at a much slower pace as evidenced by Q1 and Q2 GDP growth of 0.2% and 0.3% respectively. With the dominant services sector accounting for 79% of GDP, the strength of consumer spending remains vital to growth, but with household savings falling and real wage growth negative, there are concerns that these will be a constraint on economic activity in the second half of calendar 2017.

The Bank of England made no change to monetary policy at its meetings in the first half of the financial year. The vote to keep Bank Rate at 0.25% narrowed to 5-3 in June highlighting that some MPC members were more concerned about rising inflation than the risks to growth. Although at September's meeting the Committee voted 7-2 in favour of keeping Bank Rate unchanged, the MPC changed their rhetoric, implying a rise in Bank Rate in "the coming months". The Council's treasury advisor Arlingclose is not convinced the UK's economic outlook justifies such a move at this stage, but the Bank's interpretation of the data seems to have shifted.

In contrast, near-term global growth prospects improved. The US Federal Reserve increased its target range of official interest rates in June for the second time in 2017 by 25bps (basis points) to between 1% and 1.25% and, despite US inflation hitting a soft patch with core CPI at 1.7%, a further similar increase is expected in its December 2017 meeting. The Fed also announced that it would be starting a reversal of its vast Quantitative Easing programme and reduce the \$4.2 trillion of bonds it acquired by initially cutting the amount it reinvests by \$10bn a month.

Geopolitical tensions escalated in August as the US and North Korea exchanged escalating verbal threats over reports about enhancements in North Korea's missile programme. The provocation from both sides helped wipe off nearly \$1 trillion from global equity markets but benefited safe-

haven assets such as gold, the US dollar and the Japanese yen. Tensions remained high, with North Korea's threat to fire missiles towards the US naval base in Guam, its recent missile tests over Japan and a further testing of its latent nuclear capabilities.

Prime Minister Theresa May called an unscheduled General Election in June, to resolve uncertainty but the surprise result has led to a minority Conservative government in coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party. This clearly results in an enhanced level of political uncertainty. Although the potential for a so-called hard Brexit is diminished, lack of clarity over future trading partnerships, in particular future customs agreements with the rest of the EU block, is denting business sentiment and investment. The reaction from the markets on the UK election's outcome was fairly muted, business confidence now hinges on the progress (or not) of Brexit negotiations, the ultimate 'divorce bill' for the exit and whether new trade treaties and customs arrangements are successfully concluded to the UK's benefit.

In the face of a struggling economy and Brexit-related uncertainty, Arlingclose expects the Bank of England to take only a very measured approach to any monetary policy tightening, and any increase will be gradual and limited as the interest rate backdrop will have to provide substantial support to the UK economy through the Brexit transition.

Financial markets: Gilt yields displayed significant volatility over the six-month period with the appearing change in sentiment in the Bank of England's outlook for interest rates, the push-pull from expectations of tapering of Quantitative Easing (QE) in the US and Europe and from geopolitical tensions, which also had an impact. The yield on the 5-year gilts fell to 0.35% in mid-June, but then rose to 0.80% by the end of September. The 10-year gilts similarly rose from their lows of 0.93% to 1.38% at the end of the quarter, and those on 20-year gilts from 1.62% to 1.94%.

The FTSE 100 nevertheless powered away reaching a record high of 7548 in May but dropped back to 7377 at the end of September. Money markets rates have remained low: 1-month, 3-month and 12-month LIBID rates have averaged 0.25%, 0.30% and 0.65% over the period from January to 21st September.

Credit background: UK bank credit default swaps continued their downward trend, reaching three year lows by the end of June. Bank share prices have not moved in any particular pattern.

There were a few credit rating changes during the quarter. The significant change was the downgrade by Moody's to the UK sovereign rating in September from Aa1 to Aa2 which resulted in subsequent downgrades to sub-sovereign entities including local authorities. Moody's downgraded Standard Chartered Bank's long-term rating to A1 from Aa3 on the expectation that the bank's profitability will be lower following management's efforts to de-risk their balance sheet. The agency also affirmed Royal Bank of Scotland's and NatWest's long-term ratings at Baa1, placed Lloyds Bank's A1 rating on review for upgrade, revised the outlook of Santander UK plc, and Nationwide and Coventry building societies from negative to stable but downgraded the long-term rating of Leeds BS from A2 to A3. The agency downgraded long-term ratings of the major Canadian banks on the expectation of a more challenging operating environment and the ratings of the large Australian banks on its view of the rising risks from their exposure to the Australian housing market and the elevated proportion of lending to residential property investors.

S&P also revised Nordea Bank's outlook to stable from negative, whilst affirming their long-term rating at AA-. The agency also upgraded the long-term rating of ING Bank from A to A+.

Ring-fencing, which requires the larger UK banks to separate their core retail banking activity from the rest of their business, is expected to be implemented within the next year. In May,

following Arlingclose's advice, the Authority reduced the maximum duration of unsecured investments with Bank of Scotland, HSBC Bank and Lloyds Bank from 13 months to 6 months as until banks' new structures are finally determined and published, the different credit risks of the 'retail' and 'investment' banks cannot be known for certain.

The new EU regulations for Money Market Funds were finally approved and published in July and existing funds will have to be compliant by no later than 21st January 2019. The key features include Low Volatility NAV (LVNAV) Money Market Funds which will be permitted to maintain a constant dealing NAV, providing they meet strict new criteria and minimum liquidity requirements. MMFs will not be prohibited from having an external fund rating (as had been suggested in draft regulations). Arlingclose expects most of the short-term MMFs it recommends to convert to the LVNAV structure and awaits confirmation from each fund.

Regulatory Updates

MiFID II: Local authorities are currently treated by regulated financial services firms as professional clients who can "opt down" to be treated as retail clients instead. But from 3rd January 2018, as a result of the second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II), local authorities will be treated as retail clients who can "opt up" to be professional clients, providing that they meet certain criteria. Regulated financial services firms include banks, brokers, advisers, fund managers and custodians, but only where they are selling, arranging, advising or managing designated investments. In order to opt up to professional, the authority must have an investment balance of at least £10 million and the person authorised to make investment decisions on behalf of the authority must have at least one year's relevant professional experience. In addition, the firm must assess that that person has the expertise, experience and knowledge to make investment decisions and understand the risks involved.

The main additional protection for retail clients is a duty on the firm to ensure that the investment is "suitable" for the client. However, local authorities are not protected by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme nor are they eligible to complain to the Financial Ombudsman Service whether they are retail or professional clients. It is also likely that retail clients will face an increased cost and potentially restricted access to certain products including money market funds, pooled funds, treasury bills, bonds, shares and to financial advice. The Authority has declined to opt down to retail client status in the past as the costs were thought to outweigh the benefits.

The Authority meets the conditions to opt up to professional status and intends to do so in order to maintain their current MiFID status.

CIPFA Consultation on Prudential and Treasury Management Codes: In February 2017 CIPFA canvassed views on the relevance, adoption and practical application of the Treasury Management and Prudential Codes and after reviewing responses launched a further consultation on changes to the codes in August with a deadline for responses of 30th September 2017.

The proposed changes to the Prudential Code include the production of a new high-level Capital Strategy report to full council which will cover the basics of the capital programme and treasury management. The prudential indicators for capital expenditure and the authorised borrowing limit would be included in this report but other indicators may be delegated to another committee. There are plans to drop certain prudential indicators, however local indicators are recommended for ring fenced funds (including the HRA) and for group accounts. Other proposed changes include applying the principles of the Code to subsidiaries.

Proposed changes to the Treasury Management Code include the potential for non-treasury investments such as commercial investments in properties in the definition of “investments” as well as loans made or shares brought for service purposes. Another proposed change is the inclusion of financial guarantees as instruments requiring risk management and addressed within the Treasury Management Strategy. Approval of the technical detail of the Treasury Management Strategy may be delegated to a committee rather than needing approval of full Council. There are also plans to drop or alter some of the current treasury management indicators.

CIPFA intends to publish the two revised Codes towards the end of 2017 for implementation in 2018/19, although CIPFA plans to put transitional arrangements in place for reports that are required to be approved before the start of the 2018/19 financial year. The Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and CIPFA wish to have a more rigorous framework in place for the treatment of commercial investments as soon as is practical. It is understood that DCLG will be revising its Investment Guidance (and its MRP guidance) for local authorities in England; however there have been no discussions with the devolved administrations yet.

Local Context

On 31st March 2017, the Authority had net worth of £138.8m arising from its revenue and capital income and expenditure. The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), while usable reserves and working capital are the underlying resources available for investment. These factors are summarised in table 1 below.

Table 1: Balance Sheet Summary

	31.3.17 Actual £m
General Fund CFR	29.6
HRA CFR	155.1
Total CFR	184.7
Less: Usable reserves	-43.9
Less: Working capital	-2.0
Net worth	138.8

The Authority’s current strategy is to maintain a minimum investment balance of £10m with a view to borrowing to fund the rest of the house building programme probably later in 2017. The treasury management position as at 30th September 2017 and the change over the period is shown in table 2 below.

Table 2: Treasury Management Summary

	31.3.17 Balance £m	Movement £m	30.9.17 Balance £m	30.9.17 Rate %
Long-term borrowing	185.5	0	185.5	2.96
Total borrowing	185.5	0	185.5	2.96
Short-term investments	25.0	-10.0	15.0	0.37
Cash and cash equivalents	16.3	-1.2	15.1	0.21
Total investments	41.3	-11.2	30.1	0.29
Net borrowing	144.2	-11.2	155.4	

The reduction in investments is mainly due to the major capital programmes of the Epping Forest Shopping Park and house building.

Borrowing Strategy during the half year

At 31st March 2017, the Authority held £185.5m of loans, this has remained static over the year as slippage in the capital programme has meant the need to borrow has not materialised. The average rate of interest payable is 2.96%, and a weighted average maturity of 19.5 years.

The Authority's chief objective when borrowing has been to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty over the period for which funds are required, with flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Authority's long-term plans change being a secondary objective.

It was envisaged that further borrowing would be required within the early part of the 2017/18 financial year but this has been abated due to investment balances remaining higher than expected.

Investment Activity

The Authority holds significant invested funds, representing the amount of balances and reserves held. Investment balances are depleting in line with the major capital spend on the Epping Forest Shopping Park and major house building programmes. The investment position during the half year is shown in table 3 below.

Table 3: Investment Position

	31.3.17 Balance £m	Movement £m	30.9.17 Balance £m	30.9.17 Weighted average rate %	30.9.17 Weighted average maturity (Days)
Banks & building societies (unsecured)	16.3	-0.2	16.1	0.41	88.9
Government (incl. local authorities)	15.0	-11.0	4.0	0.17	67.0
Money Market Funds	10.0	0.0	10.0	0.22	1.0
Total investments	41.3	-11.2	30.1	0.29	56.7

Both the CIPFA Code and government guidance require the Authority to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its investments before seeking the highest rate of return, or yield. The Authority's objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate

balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.

Investment balances are being utilised to fund the major capital schemes at present, as the interest rates on investments remain low, thus reducing the need to borrow.

Table 5: Investment Benchmarking

	Credit Score	Credit Rating	Bail-in Exposure	WAM* (days)	Rate of Return
31.03.2017	3.97	AA-	60%	47	0.99%
30.09.2017	4.60	A+	84%	18	0.29%
Similar LAs	4.39	AA-	65%	108	1.43%
All LAs	4.44	AA-	64%	40	1.12%

*Weighted average maturity

As the capital programme progresses funds are being kept on shorter notice periods to ensure sufficient funds are available when required. This means the counterparties that are being used, e.g. banks and building societies are increasing our exposure to the “bail-in” process. Also, keeping investments short term means that the rates of return are not as good as other local authorities with longer dated and more diversified portfolios.

Coupled with the above, the recent Sovereign downgrade of the UK, and subsequent downgrades of certain counterparties, by the rating agencies sees a small drop in the average credit rating of investments used by the Council.

Performance Report

The Authority measures the financial performance of its treasury management activities both in terms of its impact on the revenue budget and its relationship to benchmark interest rates, as shown in table 6 below.

Table 6: Performance

	Actual £m	Budget £m	Over/ (under)	Actual %	Benchmark %	Over/ (under)
Short Term Investments	15.71	16.05	(0.34)	0.37	0.40	(0.03)
Cash and Cash Equivalents	22.68	21.50	1.18	0.21	0.22	(0.01)
Total Investments	38.39	37.55	0.84	0.29	0.31	(0.02)
PWLB Borrowing	185.5	185.5	0.0	2.96	3.00	(0.04)
Short Term Borrowing	0.0	25.0	25.0	0.00	1.00	(1.00)
Total debt	185.5	210.5	25.00	2.96	2.76	n/a
GRAND TOTAL	147.11	172.95	25.84	n/a	n/a	n/a

Compliance Report

The Director of Resources is pleased to report that treasury management activities undertaken during the first half of 2017/18 complied with the CIPFA Code of Practice and the Authority’s approved Treasury Management Strategy with the exception of minor breaches with Nat West

Bank whilst waiting for major payments to be made. Compliance with specific investment limits is demonstrated in table 7 below.

Table 7: Investment Limits

	30.9.17 Actual	2017/18 Limit	Complied
Any single organisation, except UK Government	3 x £5m and 1 x £0.1m	£5m each	✓
UK Central Government	£0m	unlimited	✓
Local Authorities	£4m	£25m in total	✓
Any group of funds under the same management	Up to £5m	£5m per group	✓
Any group of pooled funds under the same management	£0m	£10m per manager	✓
Negotiable instruments held in broker's nominee account	£0m	£15m per broker	✓
Foreign countries	£0m	£5m per country	✓
Registered Providers	£0m	£10m in total	✓
Unsecured investments with Building Societies	£1m	£5m in total	✓
Loans to unrated corporates	£0m	£5m in total	✓
Money Market Funds	£10m	£20m in total	✓

Compliance with the authorised limit and operational boundary for external debt is demonstrated in table 8 below.

Table 8: Debt Limits

	30.9.17 Actual	2017/18 Operational Boundary	2017/18 Authorised Limit	Complied
Borrowing	£185.5m	£240m	£250m	✓

Since the operational boundary is a management tool for in-year monitoring it is not significant if the operational boundary is breached on occasions due to variations in cash flow, and this is not counted as a compliance failure.

Treasury Management Indicators

The Authority measures and manages its exposures to treasury management risks using the following indicators.

Security: The Authority has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the value-weighted average credit rating of its investment portfolio. This is calculated by applying a score to each investment (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) and taking the arithmetic average, weighted by the size of each investment. Unrated investments are assigned a score based on their perceived risk.

	30.9.17 Actual	2017/18 Target	Complied
Portfolio average credit rating	A+	A-	✓

Liquidity: The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount of cash available to meet unexpected payments within a rolling three month period, without additional borrowing.

	30.9.17 Actual	2017/18 Target	Complied
Total cash available within 3 months	£32.3m	£15m	✓

Interest Rate Exposures: This indicator is set to control the Authority's exposure to interest rate risk. The upper limits on fixed and variable rate interest rate exposures, expressed as the proportion of net principal borrowed was:

	30.9.17 Actual	2017/18 Limit	Complied
Upper limit on fixed interest rate exposure	83%	100%	✓
Upper limit on variable interest rate exposure	17%	75%	✓

Fixed rate investments and borrowings are those where the rate of interest is fixed for at least 12 months, measured from the start of the financial year or the transaction date if later. All other instruments are classed as variable rate.

Maturity Structure of Borrowing: This indicator is set to control the Authority's exposure to refinancing risk. The upper and lower limits on the maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing were:

	30.9.17 Actual	Upper Limit	Lower Limit	Complied
Under 12 months	0%	100%	0%	✓
12 months and within 24 months	0%	100%	0%	✓
24 months and within 5 years	17%	100%	0%	✓
5 years and within 10 years	0%	100%	0%	✓
10 years and above	83%	100%	0%	✓

Time periods start on the first day of each financial year. The maturity date of borrowing is the earliest date on which the lender can demand repayment.

Principal Sums Invested for Periods Longer than 364 days: The purpose of this indicator is to control the Authority's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments. The limits on the long-term principal sum invested to final maturities beyond the period end were:

	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
Actual principal invested beyond year end	0	0	0
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	£15m	£5m	£5m
Complied	✓	✓	✓

Outlook for the remainder of 2017/18

The UK economy faces a challenging outlook as the minority government continues to negotiate the country's exit from the European Union. Both consumer and business confidence remain subdued. Household consumption growth, the driver of UK GDP growth, has softened following a contraction in real wages. Savings rates are at an all-time low and real earnings growth (i.e. after inflation) struggles in the face of higher inflation.

The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee has changed its rhetoric, implying a rise in Bank Rate in "the coming months". Arlingclose is not convinced the UK's economic outlook justifies such a move at this stage, but the Bank's interpretation of the data seems to have shifted.

This decision is still very data dependant and Arlingclose is, for now, maintaining its central case for Bank Rate at 0.25% whilst introducing near-term upside risks to the forecast as shown below. Arlingclose's central case is for gilt yields to remain broadly stable in the across the medium term, but there may be near term volatility due to shifts in interest rate expectations.

	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20
Official Bank Rate													
Upside risk	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Arlingclose Central Case	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Downside risk	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25